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Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC, 764 F. Supp.2d 765 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2014). 
 
Hannah S. Cail  
 
ABSTRACT 
 In Jackson v. Payday Financial, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held loan a 
provision requiring arbitration in tribal court was unreasonable and substantially and 
procedurally unconscionable.  The Court rejected Payday’s argument that the dispute belonged 
in tribal court, because there was no subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, and the 
defendants did not raise a colorable claim for tribal jurisdiction or tribal exhaustion.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  The Seventh Circuit held in Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC, that the arbitration 
provision in the defendant loan entities’ short-term, high-interest loan agreement, which required 
arbitration in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s (“CRST”) courts, was unreasonable and 
substantially and procedurally unconscionable.1  The district court erred in granting the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue, and rejected the alternative finding that the 
dispute should be resolved in the tribal courts.2  First, the Seventh Circuit established federal 
jurisdiction to review the case.3  Second, the court examined the loan agreement’s forum 
selection clause, and found it unreasonable because the tribal arbitral forum does not exist.4  
Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ alternative argument that all litigation should be 
conducted in the CRST’s courts.5  
 
                                                 
1
 764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2014). 
2
 Id. at 770. 
3
 Id. at 784. 
4
 Id. at 776. 
5
 Id. at 786. 
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II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff Illinois residents, Deborah Jackson, Linda Gonnella, and James Binkowski  
obtained loans online through loan entities’ websites.6  All loan entities are owned by CRST 
member Martin A. Webb.7  The terms of the agreements specify the loans are “‘governed by the 
Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution . . . and the laws of the [CRST],’ and are not subject 
‘to the laws of any state.’”8  The agreements further require any disputes “be resolved by 
arbitration conducted by the CRST [] by an authorized representative in accordance with its 
consumer dispute rules and the terms of this (a)greement.”9  The agreement provides for 
arbitration by phone or video conference.10  Two of the agreements also state they are “subject 
solely to the exclusive laws and jurisdiction of the [CRST and its] reservation.”11 
 Plaintiffs first brought their action in Illinois state court alleging violations of civil and 
criminal statutes.12  They sought restitution, statutory damages, litigations costs, an injunction to 
prevent future lending to Illinois residents, and a declaration that the arbitration provisions were 
not enforceable.  The loan entities removed the action to federal court, and moved for dismissal, 
arguing the agreement terms mandated arbitration conducted by CRST tribal court.  The district 
court agreed, and dismissed for improper venue.13   
 Plaintiffs timely appealed.  After oral argument, the Seventh Circuit remanded to the 
district court for limited factual findings as to: (1) whether CRST has applicable tribal law 
                                                 
6
 Id. at 768. 
7
 These include Payday Financial, LLC, d/b/a Lakota Cash, d/b/a Big Sky Cash, d/b/a Big $ky Cash, Western Sky 
Financial, LLC, d/b/a Western Sky Funding, d/b/a Western Sky, d/b/a westernsky.com, Great Sky Finance, LLC, 
d/b/a Great Sky Cash, d/b/a Great $ky Cash, d/b/a GSKY, Red Stone Financial, LLC, d/b/a Red Stone Cash, 
Cashcall, Incorporated. 
8
 Payday, 764 F.3d at 769.  
9
 Id. at 769-770. 
10
 Id. at 769. 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id.  
13
 Id. at 769-770. 
Jackson v. Payday Financial Case Summary 3 of 5 
readily available to the public; and (2) whether CRST has an authorized arbitration mechanism 
available to the parties.14  On remand, the district court found that CRST “Tribal law . . . c[ould] 
be acquired by reasonable means,” but that the tribal courts “have virtually no experience in 
handling claims made against defendants through private arbitration . . . .  As such, the promise 
of a meaningful and fairly conducted arbitration [wa]s a sham and an illusion.”15 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 A.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s determination of federal jurisdiction 
based on the Class Action Fairness Act.16  All necessary elements of federal jurisdiction were 
met: $5,000,000 in controversy, diversity of citizenship, and 100 or more plaintiffs in the class.17  
The appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision was valid under 28 U.S.C. § 
1231.18  An arbitration agreement is a type of forum selection clause; and the parties agreed that 
de novo review of the enforceability of the clause was appropriate.19   
 B. The Validity of the Forum Selection Clause 
 As a general rule, courts enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, and the 
Federal Arbitration Act.20  First, the court applied Abbott Laboratories v. Takeda 
Pharmaceutical Company,21 that calls for the Seventh Circuit to apply the choice of law based on 
the terms’ provisions, here, the “Indian Commerce Clause . . . and the laws of the [CRST].”22  
However, the loan entities turned to federal guidance because there was no tribal precedent on 
                                                 
14
 Payday, 764 F.3d at 770. 
15
 Id.  
16
 Id. at 771; See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
17
 Payday, 764 F.3d at 772. 
18
 Id. at 772-773 
19
 Id. at 773. 
20
 Id. at 773-774. 
21
 476 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2007). 
22
 Payday, 764 F.3d at 775. 
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the issue.23  The court then relied on MS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.24 and Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute25, which provide sets of standards for overcoming a forum selection clause’s 
presumption of validity, and determined enforcement of the loan agreements’ clause was 
unreasonable.26   
 If the forum selection clause was invalid and Illinois law governed, the court determined 
an “unconscionability” analysis was appropriate.27  Because the record indicated no actual 
arbitration procedure existed within CRST tribal court, the Seventh Circuit also noted the 
impossibility for plaintiffs to understand the process because of inconsistent and misleading 
language.28  Dispute resolution mechanisms did not exist, and “there simply was no prospect ‘of 
a meaningful and fairly conducted arbitration.’” 29  Therefore, the court found the provision 
procedurally unconscionable.30  Because the provision allowed the loan entities to represent the 
arbitration process as fair regardless of existent rules: “[t]he arbitration clause here is 
[substantively unconscionable and] void not simply because of a strong possibility of arbitrator 
bias, but because it provides that a decision is to be made under a process that is a sham from 
stem to stern.”31   
 C. Tribal Court Jurisdiction over current Litigation 
 The loan entities alternatively argued that their forum selection clause required litigation 
within CRST tribal court.32  Under Montana v. Unites States33 tribal jurisdiction does not extend 
                                                 
23
 Id. at 775. 
24
 407 U.S. 1, 10, 18 (1972). 
25
 499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 113 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1991). 
26
 Payday, 764 F.3d at 776. 
27
 Id. at 777. 
28
 Id. at 778. 
29
 Id. at 778-779. 
30
 Id. at 781. 
31
 Id. at 778-779. 
32
 Payday, 764 F.3d at 781. 
33
 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 65 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1981). 
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to nonmembers; however, the first exception states “[a] tribe may regulate . . . the activities of 
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with . . . its members, through . . . contracts…. 
”
34
  Plains Commercial Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.35 held if a tribe has no authority 
to regulate an activity, the tribal court has no jurisdiction to hear claims based on that activity.36   
 The court found the plaintiffs did not enter the reservation; transactions were through a 
website while plaintiffs were in Illinois; and their activities did not concern tribal sovereignty or 
regulation.37  Because tribal courts have limited jurisdiction, their authority to hear claims of 
nonmembers pertain to subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction, as this court found. 
“[A] nonmember’s consent to tribal authority is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of a 
tribal court.”38  Lastly, the court determined that tribal exhaustion was not required because the 
dispute did not pertain to nonmembers conduct on tribal lands; or raise issues of tribal integrity, 
sovereignty, self-government, or allocation of resources.39  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The Seventh Circuit determined the CRST member-owned loan entities’ arbitration 
provision requiring arbitration in tribal courts was unreasonable, and substantively and 
procedurally unconscionable under federal, state, and tribal law.  It reversed the district court’s 
dismissal for improper venue.  The court found that CRST courts did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction of the dispute, and no colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction was raised to invoke the 
tribal exhaustion rule. 
                                                 
34
 Payday, 764 F.3d at 781-782 (citing Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565-566 (1981)). 
35
 554 U.S. 316, 330, 128 S. Ct. 2709, 171 L. Ed. 2d 457 (2008). 
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 Payday, 764 F.3d at 782. 
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 Id. 
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 Id.  
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 Id. at 785. 
